

Kenji Dwarakadas.

KASHMIR.

MOST CONFIDENTIAL

I had about 45 minutes talk on ~~Friday~~ ^{in Para Thursday} afternoon, 27th August, with Sir Girjashankar Bajpai, Governor of Bombay. Most of it was devoted to discussing the Kashmir problem. Sir Girjashankar was the Secretary General of the External Affairs Department till early last year and since 1947 was in charge of Kashmir problem in that capacity. ~~From~~ ^{Last} year he went on behalf of India to Geneva to see Graham. Bajpai - we know each other since 1920 - said he would willingly answer my questions.

He knows Mohammad Ali, Pakistan's Prime Minister, and ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ met him in Washington when Bajpai was in the Indian Embassy and Mohammad Ali was Pakistan's High Commissioner for Canada. Bajpai said that he ^{had} received ^{some deep base} full notes of the talks which Nehru had with Mohammad Ali in Karachi last month. I told him that Sadiq was of the opinion that there would be no plebiscite and that the Nehru-Ali Agreement meant ~~xxxxxxxx~~ nothing. Bajpai said "You need not have gone to see Sadiq to tell you that; I could have myself said that to you". Bajpai explained a few points. "Nothing can be decided by a plebiscite. India will have ^a good majority in Jammu and ^{a bare} ~~xxxx~~ majority in the Valley and that would help to have an overall ^{intra} majority in the whole of Kashmir. But would it decide anything? No! The Azad Kashmir in Pakistan would not, in spite of losing in the plebiscite, quietly walk out of Kashmir. On the other hand if India loses the plebiscite how do you think the Hindus in Jammu would agree quietly to hand over Kashmir to Pakistan. ^{or} ~~Whichever~~ way the plebiscite goes there is bound to be trouble. Therefore, some way of handling the

will have to be found". As far as he was concerned, Bajpai said that the only solution could be partition, either agreed or through regional plebiscite. Bajpai said that he would not like to be quoted on this because he was not sure that Prime Minister Nehru would accept this solution at this stage. I asked him "Is it not true as reported by Trumbull, the New York Times Special Correspondent, that in the London talks Mohammad Ali had as good as agreed to such a partition of Kashmir. Bajpai said that was not true. I told Bajpai that Sadiq was saying that the Kashmir Government had documentary evidence of American intrigues and interference in the Kashmir problem with particular reference to Abdullah. Bajpai said that he would like the publication of such "evidence" clearly implying that he did not believe that there existed any such evidence for the simple reason that no intrigues and interference had taken place. When I told Bajpai that Sadiq was strongly anti-~~Communist~~ ^{anti-American} he said he was not surprised to hear this for he knew all this time that not only Bakshi and Sadiq but also Abdullah were hopelessly anti-U.K. and Anti-U.S. and they saw nothing good about the U.K. and U.S. When I met Abdullah four years ago he gave expression to the wildest kind of anti-American and anti-U.K. views. I asked Bajpai if it was not necessary for Nehru and the Government of India to contradict these untrue anti-American reports. Bajpai said "The very fact that Nehru has not endorsed these anti-American opinions is enough contradiction of such ~~wild~~ wild reports".

I asked Bajpai if he knew all these years what I knew myself about Abdullah intriguing against India; and how could Government of India trust him so long. Bajpai tried to give me a

diplomatic answer, but he left no doubt as to what his own opinion was. He said "Well, it all depends on how one makes appraisal of another's character. I had one point of view about Abdullah and the Prime Minister had another point of view and we had to leave at that. Bajpai added that Nehru finally came to know all about Abdullah since February this year.". I asked "In that case why was action delayed so long?" Bajpai said that he had that very morning received a letter from the Prime Minister saying how sad he was feeling over the treachery of his old friend Abdullah. I asked Bajpai if according to him there could be no plebiscite next year or the year after that, *how* was it useful to come to an agreement at this state which meant nothing? Bajpai said "Sufficient unto the day etc....." and waved his hand. "The most important point at this time was to prevent a clash and that at least the agreement has done. Later events ~~would~~ will take care of themselves." *add here 'A' - see page 6*

We discussed many other matters and throughout this talk Hira, the General Manager of the Western Railway, was also present.

I suggested to Bajpai if he would not write out his memoirs and reminiscences of the last 35 years because I found most people in India were completely ignorant of the events between 1918 and 1935 and such memoirs/^{would}~~xxx~~ give an objective story of India. Bajpai's reply was: "Most of what I know and could write would be unprintable."

him
Before I left I gave Bajpai my confidential Note of my talk with Sadiq and suggested that he could pass it on to Nehru and make such other discrete and confidential use of it as he ~~thought~~ thought fit.

This morning's Bharat Jyoti says:-

" Bakshi Gulam Mahomed, Premier of Kashmir, during his brief visit to Delhi, this week, is reported to have shown the Prime Minister Shri Nehru, the documents in his possession proving the "interference of certain foreign powers" in Kashmir affairs. unconfirmed reports say that he sought the permission of Shri Nehru to release them to the public. Shri Nehru is stated to have told Bakshi that he could use his own discretion and do what he considered best under the circumstances. Bakshi, it is learnt, has decided to publish them at an appropriate moment."

Morarji Desai-

I had already a talk with Morarji Desai on the Kashmir affair some days back. ~~xxxxxxx~~ On Friday the 28th morning when I saw him in Poona I gave him a copy of my Note of my talk with Sadiq.

Morarji said that whilst he did not believe that the U.S. had intrigued and interfered in the Kashmir problem, he was of opinion that American did want Kashmir to be independent. He exclaimed "Look at the way the Americans had behaved in the Korean affair. Why is ^{us} ~~she~~ taking such an anti-India attitude?" Morarji complained that the Americans were subsidizing papers in India which, he said, was wrong and creating unpleasantness in this country against the Americans. Morarji also complained that the Americans' Consulates were keeping too much friends with Minoo Masani and S.K.Patil. Minoo was an enemy of Nehru and how could you find fault with Nehru if he was upset with Americans because of their too close relations with Minoo and Patil. Morarji went on "I gave Mrs.Vera Dean a dinner and we talked for about three hours. I found her to be a very balanced, steady and honest

woman". I told him I had myself an hour's talk with Mrs. Dean and I had the same pleasant and favourable reaction about her. (Morarji was interested to find out from me what Mrs. Dean thought of him). Morarji said that Mrs. Dean had a very poor opinion about Mino Masani and his work in India and she thought that he was overdoing pro-American-anti-Communist stunt. Mrs. Dean had said the same thing to me. *add here 'B' see page 6'*

Regarding plebiscite Morarji said "There cannot be any plebiscite. India needs and wants Kashmir and how can we let it go!" I said that in that case ^{if} ~~it~~ ^{were no} ~~was not a~~ plebiscite there ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~very~~ bound to be trouble from Pakistan. "Nothing of the kind", said Morarji "Pakistan is too weak to make much trouble. See what is happening in East Bengal. There Pakistan is very weak and sooner or later East Pakistan will break away from West Pakistan." I am afraid this is taking things too far.

It is perhaps necessary to refer to my talks with Dr. Jivraj Mehta, Finance Minister and Shantilal Shah, Labour Minister. Jivraj asked me "Are you sure Allen did not go to Kashmir to take his wife there?" This he asked me in spite of the Ambassador's denial in the Press. I told him I was quite sure that Allen did not go to Kashmir at all.

Shantilal said that the Consulate and the Embassy should keep in touch with the Indian Press and issue statements now and again to avoid any misunderstanding. I told Shantilal that the position of a foreign embassy is ~~very~~ delicate and if it tries to get too much publicity in the Indian Press, the charge ~~is~~ would be laid against it that there is undue attempt of interfering in the

internal affairs of the country.

BOMBAY,
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See page 3. A:

I asked Bappai why U.S. was unnecessarily and childishly antagonising India in regard to Korea. Bappai said that the U.S. was antagonising all her friends everywhere. This is a mad world.

See page 6 - B

Morari said Dulles was following the reactionary Republican Party, and Eisenhower seemed to be honest, and the basic honesty of Eisenhower will assert itself against the Party, and in the end Eisenhower will do the right thing.