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I. STALIN'S GENERAL PLAN FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF RUSSIA.

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In area and population tsarist Russia ranked among the leading great powers of the world, but politically, economically and in respect of cultural development she was, as is well known, extremely backward. Russia was an agricultural country, and in her agriculture preponderated the primitive wooden plow. With her vast expanses, she suffered from roadlessness. The large masses were illiterate, the press was stifled by censorship. There was an acute hunger for books, schools, medical services and cultural amenities. As stated by Lenin, Russia was a backward country, its equipment with modern instruments of production representing one-fourth that of England, one-sixth that of Germany and one-tenth that of America.

The adversities of the World War and the Civil War, which covered a period of six years, from 1914 to 1920, naturally could not do away with Russia's economic backwardness. Whereas in the United States the volume of industrial production in those six years increased by 26%, in the territory covered by Soviet Russia it dropped by 86%. But during that period Russia cast off the yoke of Tsardom and laid the foundations of a most advanced democracy. This opened the way for the Land of Soviets to bring into play the advantages of planned economy for the development of its new economic system.

The old system had been demolished to its foundations, and on its ruins it was still necessary to build the new huge structure of unseen architecture. That creative design had to be put into execution under conditions of economic competition with the old system still dominating the entire encirclement, and at the same time it was necessary to bear in mind the possibility of extremely dangerous non-economic interference on the part of that encirclement. "Perish or drive full steam ahead" -- that, in Lenin's opinion, was the alternative presented by history. "Either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically as well" --that was the task set before the Soviet system by Lenin as far back as the year 1917. The facts show that this system has acquitted itself with honour of the task to end Russia's economic backwardness.

The first blueprint for Russia's economic transformation on the technical basis of the country's electrification, known as the GOELRO Plan, was drawn up immediately after the termination of the Civil War, when Lenin was still alive. Approved by Lenin and Stalin and endorsed in 1921, that general plan, which looked 10 to 15 years ahead, was regarded by many as utopian. Foreign financiers manifested no particular inclination to invest in Soviet loans and concessions, and the State-owned enterprises of Soviet Russia seemed too narrow a base to provide sufficient accumulation for such stupendous transformations. It soon became clear, however, that under conditions of planned economy that narrow base contained within itself vast potentialities for expansion. Its potentialities far exceeded our most optimistic calculations and prognoses. But it was only several years later, after Lenin's behests and the hopes of the people, that these potentialities became fully indicated.

Today the entire world knows Stalin's famed Five-Year Plans, which enlarged upon the GOELRO Plan and most fully and concretely embodied Stalin's great general plan for the transformation of backward Russia into an advanced country.

The principal features and ideas of this plan -- the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of agriculture on the basis of modern machinery -- have already been accomplished. Stalin's idea of national and racial equality and brotherhood among the peoples of the USSR within the framework of a single federation has become the law of the country and is embodied in the Stalin constitution, which is the most democratic in the world. Furthermore, the brotherhood among peoples has been expressed not only in political equality, but in economic measures to help the more backward republics catch up with the more advanced ones, by resolutely shifting investments in economic development from West to East -- beyond the Volga and the Urals. Great progress has also been made toward accomplishing Stalin's plan of a cultural revolution in work and everyday life, securing for the working masses the enjoyment of human culture and all its benefits.

Expenditures on education increased 24-fold as compared with expenditure in Tsarist Russia. Illiteracy has been completely eliminated. In 1938 over 47 million young people in the USSR attended school and college, with the number of college students alone double their number in Germany, Italy and Japan combined. Over 1,500,000 engineers and technicians were graduated from special schools and colleges in one decade. Millions of workers have attained a high level of productivity of labour and have become Stakhanovites. Wages in the Soviet Union constantly increased even in years when they dropped in other countries. The Soviet Union has over 10,000 newspapers published in 70 languages, and an annual book production embracing about 50,000 titles in 111 languages. All that is evidence of the great progress made in the period of the Stalin Five-Year Plans.

We know that the first Five-Year Plan for the development of Soviet economy aroused a great deal of scepticism abroad. It was described as fantastic, and some said it that it couldn't be accomplished even in fifty years. Nevertheless, that plan, which considerably exceeded the provisions of the GOELRO Plan, was carried out without any assistance from foreign financiers, and even ahead of schedule -- by the end of 1932. After the first Five-Year Plan followed the second and then the third. The country mustered sufficient resources to finance the plans. The investments in Soviet economy during the 1928-32 period reached 51,000 million rubles, as against 11,000 million rubles in the 1923-27 period. In 1933-37 the investments amounted to 115,000 million rubles, and the third Five-Year Plan called for an investment of 181,000 million rubles. The actual investments prior to the war, in the years 1938-40 amounted to 108,000 rubles.

Already after the first Five-Year Plan Joseph Stalin was able to sum its results in the following statement: "During this period the USSR has become radically transformed and has cast off the integument of backwardness and medievalism. From an agrarian country it has become an industrial country. From a land of small individual agriculture it has become a land of collective, large-scale, mechanized agriculture. From an ignorant, illiterate and uncultured country it has become -- or rather it is becoming -- a literate and cultured country covered by a vast network of higher, intermidiate and elementary schools teaching in the languages of the nationalities of the USSR".

In 1933, when Hitler came to power, the Berlin Konjuktur Institute sounded the alarm that the USSR had outstripped Germany in volume of industrial output. Indeed, while in Germany the output of industry in the period between 1928 and 1932 had dropped nearly to a half, in the USSR it had more than doubled, with the result that it left both Germany and France behind. Here is another eloquent fact. In the United States, as the result of the crash in 1929, the number of unemployed, according to estimates of the AF of L increased by 1932 from 1,864,000 to 13,182,000. In the USSR the number of unemployed during the same period dropped from about 1,500,000 to nil. The steadily growing demand for labour power put an end to unemployment. In this connection it is pertinent to recall that in 1913 the number of workers and office employees in the territory now covered by the USSR was only 16,700,000. By 1928 their number had increased to 17,300,000; by 1932 to 22,900,000; by 1937 to 27,000,000 and by 1940, the last pre-war year, to 30,800,000. Particularly notable was the increase in the number of industrial workers, which more than trebled in the course of one decade. That was a growth unprecedented in any of the advanced countries of the West. At the same time this labour army, reequipped with up-to-date machinery on the basis of electric power development, outstripped the countries of the West also in the rate of increase of labour productivity. Whereas in England and Germany, for instance, the annual

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output per worker increased during the period 1928-37 by only 11-12 percent, in the USSR it increased during the same period by 150 percent. Further, whereas in Germany the total volume of industrial output in the 25 years from 1913 to 1938, despite intense preparation for war, increased only 31.6 percent, in the USSR the increase during the same period amounted to 908.8 percent. In 1940, two years later, the volume of industrial output in the USSR was already more than tenfold larger than in 1913.

As the result of the accomplishment of Stalin's plan for the transformation of Russia, the Soviet Union advanced to first place in Europe, its total output exceeding not only that of Hitler Germany, but the combined output of Germany, Italy and Japan. As regards the proportion of machinery construction in the total output the USSR advanced to first place in the world even before the war, the output of machines during the Soviet period having increased more than 50 times. This has proved to be a major factor in the war, in which engines play such a big part.

Successful defence, however, requires not only engines, but food. The supply of food has been kept on an adequate level thanks to the collectivization of the countryside in line with Stalin's plan. This collectivization has greatly improved the prosperity of the farmers and doubled the output of farm produce.

And the Stalin policy with regard to nationalities, coupled with the cultural revolution in our country of most progressive democracy, has given us something that is even more valuable than food and machinery. It has given us the high morale of the Red Army and the inseverable unity between the fighting front and the home front throughout the length and breadth of the multi-national country. That is why when the Fascist aggressor countries decided to pass on from peaceful competition in the economic sphere to sharper forms of contest with arms in hand they received a crushing rebuff.

Stalin's economic policy has thus proved to be a farsighted prerequisite for the accomplishment of Stalin's strategy, too.

II. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION IN THE USSR.

By Engineer G. Susloparov,
Head of the Rural Electrification Department of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR.

The introduction of electricity in agriculture began only after the October Revolution of 1917. Before the Revolution there were altogether 80 electrical installations in rural districts, and those served landed estates and were used only for lighting purposes.

The First World War and the three years of Civil War that followed it greatly undermined the backward industries of tsarist Russia and her agriculture. Nevertheless the Soviet Government began from its very inception to devote considerable attention to the spreading of electricity in the countryside. Vladimir Lenin, when he set up a commission to draw up a plan for the electrification of Russia, made a particular point of the necessity of rural electrification.

In 1921 the first rural hydro-electric power plant was built with Lenin's direct aid on the river Lama in the District of Volokolamsk, Moscow Region. It was known as the Yaropole Hydroelectric Power Plant and served 17 villages, 10 elementary schools one middle school, a children's sanatorium and a number of cooperative factories. Lenin personally attended the opening of the Yaropole plant and in his address on that occasion called upon the peasants to build small hydroelectric plants in the villages.

Individual peasant farms could not undertake the construction and utilization of power installations on any appreciable scale. It was only after 1930, when farming became largely collectivised, that the construction of rural electric power plants assumed wide proportions. This construction was greatly stimulated by the rapid development of industry and the building of large industrial power plants with extensions into rural districts.

The Soviet Union abounds in water-power resources. In most of the districts of the country there is enough water power for the construction of large and small hydroelectric plants. Collective farms, singly or in groups, therefore began to build small hydroelectric plants. Just before the beginning of the present great Patriotic War, there were over 7,000 rural electric power installations, with about ten thousand collective farms and several thousand machine-tractor stations and state farms electrified. The consumption of electricity in agriculture aggregated about 500 million k.w.h. a year.

Electricity came to be used widely in the rural districts not only for lighting and household purposes, but in agricultural production -- in threshing, water supply, irrigation, fodder production, cow milking, sheep fleecing, incubation etc. In 1940 there were over 4000 electric threshing installations in operation during the harvest season. In some regions and districts rural electrification was approaching the 100 percent mark. The Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant alone supplied electricity to 433 collective farms. In fact, the regions of Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye were already nearly a 100 percent electrified.

In 1940 also most of the collective farms in the neighbourhood of large cities and industrial centres were electrified. The collective farms in the neighbourhood of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Gorky, Sverdlovsk employed electricity in most of their farming activity.

The 1941 plan called for the construction of 450 rural hydroelectric power plants, each serving 4-5 collective farms. In addition it was planned to reequip numerous flourmills to serve as hydroelectric plants and to build extensions from industrial power plants to rural districts.

The attack of fascist Germany interfered with the fulfilment of the original plans of rural electrification. It must be noted, however, that despite the wartime conditions the collective farms of the central and eastern sections of the country did not suspend the work of building electric power installations. As a matter of fact the construction of rural electric power plants made considerable headway in the Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics and in the Daghestan and Udmurt Autonomous Soviet republics.

Since the beginning of the war over 20 rural electric power plants supplying electricity to more than 100 collective farms have been built in the Uzbek SSR. In the Tajik SSR the construction of 15 rural hydroelectric power plants was begun in 1941. In the Georgian SSR the Alazan Hydroelectric Power Plant of 6000 kilowatt capacity, completed and put into operation in 1942, supplies most of its output of electricity to the tinned food industry and the wineries of collective farms.

The collective farms are fully aware of the advantages of the use of electricity in farming, and we, therefore, witness an ever widening movement among them to make use of available water power resources to build hydroelectric power plants. As a rule the work is done by the collective farmers themselves, and the construction of such plants usually takes not more than a year and in some cases as little as 4 to 6 months. To encourage this initiative of the collective farms, the Government grants them special credits through the Agricultural Bank and supplies them equipment and materials. A special organization, the Rural Electrification Department of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, provides the collective farms technical aid and leadership in drawing up projects, in the construction and in the installation of power plants. The offices of this organization in the various regions, territories and republics carry out the work on the basis of agreement with the respective collective farms.

In 1945 it is planned to built 2300 rural hydroelectric power plants. In a number of regions and republics the work has already started. The Sverdlovsk Region, for example, will build with the help of industrial enterprises 300 rural hydroelectric power plants which will supply electricity to 900 collective farms; in the Yaroslavl Region 50 plants will be built, in the Uzbek SSR 300, in the Leningrad Region 30, etc.

In the Ryazan Region 37 collective farms joined to build a 700 kilowatt hydroelectric power plant on the Oka River.

In the Georgian SSR work has started on the construction of the Tiripol hydroelectric plant of 4000 kwt capacity, which will supply current to 150 collective farms.

The Rural Electrification Department of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR has worked out type projects for hydroelectric structures and transmission lines.

In order not to overburden the industries engaged in war production, hydroelectric plants up to a 100 HP capacity are supplied with simplified wooden-blade hydroturbines devised by Prof. Sokolov, and with Francis' welded hydroturbines perfected by the All-Union Hydro-Engineering Institute.

The Institute of Mechanization and Electrification of Agriculture has devised a mixed system of electricity distribution with the application of single-phase trans-formers and single-phase engines.

In the regions and districts which were overrun by the German invaders, the latter as a rule wrecked all rural power installations. Today the collective farmers in the liberated areas, with Government aid and the assistance of socialist industry, are making good the damage caused by the fascist vandals to rural electrification. In the regions of Moscow,

....Tula,

Tula, Kalinin and Stalingrad all the wrecked power installations have already been restored. The Yaropole Hydroelectric Plant in the Moscow Region, which the Germans had wrecked, was fully restored already in 1943. In the Leningrad Region six hydroelectric plants blown up by the Germans before their retreat were restored in 1944. In North Caucasus 11 hydro-electric plants were put into operation in 1944. Considerable progress has been made in the restoration of electrical power plants in the Ukraine, Belorussia and in the Crimea.

The collective farming system in the Soviet countryside has stood the test of the war and has demonstrated its ability not only to heal the wounds inflicted by the German invaders on agriculture but also to expand agriculture on the basis of advanced technique and maximum electrification.

III. ECONOMIC VICTORIES.

By N. Petrov.

The past year affords the reviewer, both military and economic, a greater wealth of material to treat than any of the previous years of war. It has been a particularly big year in every respect. First and foremost it saw all of Soviet territory liberated from the invaders. The ground for this military victory of the Soviet Union was laid by its economic victory, while the former introduced radical changes in the economic situtation and opened new opportunities for the further development of Soviet economy.

Look back a year and recall where the frontline was at that time. According to the war bulletin of the Soviet Information Bureau for December 31, 1943, fighting was going on in the Nevel, Vitebsk-Orsha and Zhitomir areas and in the Dnieper bend west of Zaporoshye. Today all these areas are far behind the frontlines.

A year ago the whole burden of the war rested on the eastern and central industrial and agricultural areas of the Soviet Union. Tremendous steppe expanses in the Ukraine were still in enemy hands. The Germans were no longer in a position to get anything out of the Krivoi Rog and Nikopol ore fields, but their wealth had not yet been returned to the Soviet Union. Belorussia and the Baltic republics were held by the Germans

The past year has completely changed the picture.

Today the Soviet Union is once more in possesion of all its territories, and in spite of the incredible damage done by the enemy, the liberated areas have already made themselves felt in the economic tally sheet for the year. As a matter of fact, one of the outstanding features of 1944 was the resumption by the redeemed areas of production for the front.

The Donbas, to wreck which the Germans employed all their engineering skill and which suffered more than any other coal field in this or any other war, today has reached one-third of its pre-war production. This is of tremendous significance. The Ukrainian railways, which serve the southern sector of the front, operate on Donbas coal. One could very well say that by liberating the Donbas the Red Army opened itself the road to Budapest.

Neither this nor past wars have seen the resources of territories redeemed from the enemy put to use in such quick time. Moreover, in no previous war has any army wreaked such damage as the Germans did on the territories they seized.

The beginning of the regeneration of the Donbas and the restoration of railway transport have contributed both to the successful offensive offensive of the Red Army and the rehabilitation of other fields of Nazi-wrecked industry. The several dozen blast and open-hearth furnaces restarted in the Donbas, although they have not reached capacity yet, already produce tens of thousands of tons of pig iron and steel. To restart them, however, required more than the efforts of the iron and steel men themselves. Collieries, iron ore and mangenese mines, refractory works, coke ovens, electric power stations and power transmission lines, water supply systems and housing accommodations for thousands of workers had to be reconditioned. The promotion of the restoration of industry, particularly the heavy industry of the Ukraine, is perhaps the most important economic development of the year.

Restoration, however, has not been limited to industry alone. Intensive work has been going on to rehabilitate agriculture as well. Moreover, the difficulties in this respect have already been overcome. Suffice it to point out that the Ukraine this year sowed and harvested three-fourths of her pre-war grain and industrial crop area.

The total area under crops throughout the USSR this year increased by 12 million hectares (a hectare equals 2.47 acres). All of which amounts

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to that agriculture has lived through its most
farms of the liberated areas have played their
In reviewing the rehabilitation work done dur
striking of all its aspects is the speed with which i
Nothing like it was achieved during the restoration wo
the first world war either in Russia or, for example in Fra
What accounts for the present rehabilitation pace in our
planned economy, the concentration of all resources in the hands
state and able utilization of these resources. Another highly important
factor is the moral one, the fact that all sections of Soviet society are
deeply interested in the speediest rehabilitattion of war-damaged economy. 6
The Germans could wreck mines, but they could not break the spirit of the
miners. Because of this the day after the liberation of the Donbas, for
instance, its miners began producing double and treble their daily quotas,
its women volunteered for work in the collieries to help their husbands,
veteran miners returned to work instead of taking advantage of their privi-
lege to rest in their old age, and youngsters who had never seen a mine
before began to vie with the old guard of colliers on the job.

If the liberated areas helped supply the Red Army, it is the areas
deep in the interior that have been the mainstay of the Soviet Union's
economy during this year as they were in previous years of war. Rapid
development of industry and agriculture has continued in the Volga area,
the Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Not for a single day has
the construction of new war plants, iron and steel works, coal mines and
power capacities been discontinued.

The salient feature of industrial development in the interior this
year has been the growth of productivity of labour. The Urals, for instance,
as a result of increased productivity alone has boosted its output by
20-25%. The question here is of both more efficient utilization of plant
and the greater skill of the personnel.

The millions of men and women without previous industrial experience
who entered industry and transport during the first two years of war no
longer are inexperienced newcomers. It was almost miraculous how young
girls learned to assemble tommy guns and pieces of artillery in their first
two or three months on the job. Today these girls are "old-timers", and
many of them have become crew leaders and foremen. The beginners of
yesterday now themselves teach newcomers.

To this must be added that the Soviet state has not called up the
key personnel of war industry for military service. These taken together
with the new workers trained during the war have made it possible for
Soviet industry with its increased production capacity to raise the produc-
tivity of labour and launch the output of new complex types of armaments.
This is something that will make it possible to reconvert to peacetime
lines with the least pains after the war is won.

The interior areas continued to be the main suppliers of armaments
and ammunition during the past year. Here production, particularly of moder-
nized and new types of armaments and ammunition, has risen considerably.
In the tank industry, production has been boosted of new heavy tanks and
modernized medium ones. In the aircraft industry particularly rapid has
been the increase in the production of the latest types of Yakovlev and
Lavochkin fighters and Tupolev bombers. Engine works have increased the
output of more powerful engines, which in turn have improved the perfor-
mance of our aircraft. The ordinance industry has particularly pushed the
production of powerful tank guns and self-propelled artillery as well as
of anti-tank guns.

I shall not try to make any forecasts, but it may be expected that
in 1945 the share of the liberated areas in the country's economy will
increase notably alongside the further expansion of industry in the eastern
regions. The former will undoubtedly make an effort to reach their pre-war
output level, and if 1945 will not be sufficient for the achievement of
this goal, it will mark a great stride toward it.

If we remember that industry in the eastern regions has grown three-
four times over in the course of this war and add to this the rapidly
increasing output of the liberated areas, it will not be difficult to
foresee that the Soviet Union will surpass the pre-war level for a number
of important items of production already by the end of 1945.
